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SALE BY OWNER AT LOWER PRICE
CASES ARISE in which an owner employs a broker
to sell property at a certain price, the broker finds an interested prospect, but the sale is made by the owner himself at a price
less than that which was stipulated. When the broker subsequently
sues for a commission the owner raises the defense that the broker
has not fully performed, since the owner himself, not the broker,
succeeded in interesting the purchaser, and the price actually
obtained was not the amount the broker was supposed to obtain.

0CCASIONALLY

The general rule, and the rule followed in Illinois, is that if
the broker is in fact the procuring cause of the sale' he is entitled
to a commission even though the final negotiations are conducted
through the owner, who in order to make a sale accepts a price
lower than that stipulated to the broker.'
One of the earliest decisions in this area was McConaughy v.
Mahannah,8 an 1888 decision of the Appellate Court for the 2d
District. In the McConaughy case, the plaintiff had entered into a
broker's contract with the defendant by which he was to receive
a commission of 2% if he found a purchaser for the defendant's
farm at $35 per acre. Some weeks later, without the knowledge of
the plaintiff, the defendant sold her farm for $32 per acre to a
man that the plaintiff had introduced to her as a prospective purchaser. The court, finding for the plaintiff, held that the commission had been earned when the broker brought a ready, willing
and able buyer to the seller. His right to the commission was not
affected by the changes in terms agreed upon by the defendant and
the buyer.
The first Supreme Court of Illinois case dealing with this
problem was Hafner v. Herron,4 decided in 1897. Although the
case dealt with the sale of stock certificates rather than real estate,
it has been cited extensively as a controlling case by many of
the appellate decisions dealing with real estate brokers. In Hafner,
1 For a complete discussion of procuring cause, see section II (A) of this symposium.
2 Annot., 43 A.L.R. 1103 (1926); Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 848 (1956); 5 I1. L. & Pr.,
Brokers § 82 (1953).
3 28 Ill. App. 169 (2d Dist. 1888).
4 165 Il. 242, 46 N.E. 211 (1897).
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the plaintiff had agreed to sell certain shares of stock for the defendant and was to receive a commission for his services. Subsequently, the defendant sold the stock to a customer procured by
the plaintiff, but at a figure less than that which he had authorized
the plaintiff to offer. In affirming the lower court's judgment for
the plaintiff, the court said that if the plaintiff had been the procuring cause of the sale ultimately concluded by the defendant and
a buyer, then the plaintiff was entitled to his commission. The
court held that the broker's right to the commission was in no
way affected by the owner's acceptance of a sum less than that
which he had authorized the plaintiff to offer.
Hafner v. Herron was cited two years later in Snyder v.
Fearer5 for the proposition that:
Having introduced a sufficient purchaser to the owner, he
(the broker) is not to be deprived of his commissions because
the owner negotiates the contract himself or voluntarily reduces
the price of the property. 6
The commission in the Snyder case was to be $100 if the plaintiff
could find a buyer at $70 per acre. The plaintiff found a buyer
and the defendant sold to him for $68 per acre. The defendant
resisted the plaintiff's claim to the commission on the grounds that
it had not been earned. The court, having found that the plaintiff
was the procuring cause of the sale, 7 said that the fact that the

defendant had sold at a price less than $70 per acre was immaterial
to the rights of the broker.
The general rule discussed above has been applied in
numerous other Illinois decisions." However, the courts have also
recognized several exceptions to the rule.
One widely recognized exception is that when there is a
87 Ill. App. 275 (2d Dist. 1899).
6 87 Ill. App. at 277, quoting Hafner v. Herron, 165 Ill. at 251, 46 N.E. at 213.
7 The broker had called Shafer, the ultimate buyer, and told him that he had the
farm for sale and was going to see a prospect whom he thought would buy. Shafer told
him that he had been trying to buy the farm and asked him to wait until Shafer had
a chance to talk to the owner. The court found that the broker's efforts "either caused
the sale to Shafer or largely contributed to bringing it about." 87 Ill. App. at 277.
8 Henry v. Stewart, 185 Ill. 448, 57 N.E. 190 (1900); Mammen v. Snodgrass, 13 Ill.
App. 2d 538, 142 N.E.2d 791 (3d Dist. 1957); Francisco v. Coleman, 230 Ill. App. 465 (2d
Dist. 1923); Hessling v. Frey, 182 Ill. App. 547 (2d Dist. 1913); Smith v. Sears, 160 Ill. App.
240 (1911); Wright v. McClintock, 136 Ill. App. 438 (2d Dist. 1907); Ducharme v.
St. Peter, 135 Ill. App. 530 (2d Dist. 1907).
5

NOTES AND COMMENTS

special contract between the broker and his principal expressly
making the payment of a commission dependent upon the broker
finding a purchaser at a specific price, the broker cannot recover
if the sale is made at a lower price, even if the owner sells to a
person to whom the broker has first shown the property.9 Thus,
in Mears v. Stone, ° the owner authorized the plaintiffs to sell
some dock property for $150,000, and agreed to pay them a 21%
commission for making a sale for that sum. The plaintiffs succeeded in getting a Mr. Peabody to take an option to purchase at
$150,000, but Peabody did not exercise the option. Later, however, Peabody, as an undisclosed principal, purchased the property for $135,000 through another broker. When plaintiffs learned
of the sale they demanded a commission. The lower court held
that if the owner discovered that Peabody was the actual purchaser before the consummation of the contract then plaintiffs
were entitled to their commissions, and the court found for the
plaintiffs. On appeal, however, the decision was reversed, the
court stating:
Appellant having placed his property in the hands of appellees to sell at a fixed price, and for an agreed commission, he and
appellees were bound to exercise the utmost good faith toward

each other. Appellees were employed to sell at the price of

$150,000; they were not engaged to sell for $135,000, and if any
efforts were by them made to find a purchaser at the last named
price, they can hardly be considered as work done in pursuance
of the authority given to them.
* * *Appellees were not employed to merely introduce to
appellant somebody who might upon some terms become a purchaser. It was not for such service that a commission was to be
paid them.
Appellees were employed to do a certain thing, viz., sell the
property for $150,000; they were to be paid for this a certain sum,
viz., two and one-half per cent; if they had in five minutes
accomplished the undertaking they would have been entitled to
the sum of $3,750; if they did not succeed they are not entitled to
anything, unless the defendant, by some act of his, prevented
their success."

The special contract exception is, of course, qualified by the
proposition that the broker will not be precluded from re9 Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 848, 859 (1956); Annot., 43 A.L.R. 1103, 1111 (1926). See, e.g.,
Backman v. Guadalupe Realty Co., 78 Cal. App. 347, 248 Pac. 296 (1926).
10 44 111. App. 444 (1st Dist. 1892).
11 44 Ill. App. 447-448. See also, Rees v. Spruance, 45 Ill. 308 (1867) (dictum).
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covery if he is prevented from making the sale on the terms
specified by the fault or bad faith of the principal. 12 Such bad faith
is usually in the form of a deliberate revocation of the broker's
authority when he is plainly approaching success, 13 or a fraudulent reduction in price by agreement with the prospective
purchaser.'

4

Another exception to the general rule is recognized by some
states. Where the owner, either himself or acting through another
broker, makes a sale at a reduced price to a purchaser whose status
as the original broker's prospect is unknown to the owner, these
courts hold that the owner is not obligated to pay a commission
to the original broker, even if he has been the procuring cause."
These courts feel that it would be inequitable to charge the seller
with a commission where the broker has failed to notify him of
the name of the purchaser, and he sells for a lower price than he
otherwise would exact if he had known that he would have to
pay the commission. 6 This exception has been recognized in Illinois in Stone v. Kre is.17 In that case, the plaintiff had unsuccess-

fully attempted to interest a prospect named Hock in the defendant's property for two years. The owner and the prospective
buyer finally notified the plaintiff that they could not agree and
were terminating their negotiations. Some time after this discussion, the defendant sold the property to Woodward at a considerable reduction in price. Woodward actually was a secret
agent of Hock, and immediately conveyed to him. The Appellate
Court ruled that the jury should have been instructed that if
they believed that the defendant had acted in good faith at the
time he sold the property to Woodward and did not know that
Woodward was purchasing it for Hock their verdict should be
for the defendant. The court stated:
But where .

.

. there is evidence tending to show abandon-

ment of negotiations with the broker's customer, and entry upon
negotiations with another party apparently in his own interest

but in fact as the secret representative of plaintiffs' customer,
Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 848, 863 (1956); Annot., 43 A.L.R. 1103, 1115 (1926).
Is See, e.g., Heaton v. Edwards, 90 Mich. 500, 51 N.W. 544 (1892).
14 See, e.g., Biester v. Evans, 59 Ill. App. 181 (2d Dist. 1894).
15 Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 848, 872 (1956); Annot., 43 A.L.R. 1103, 1121 (1926).
16 Byerts v. Schmidt, 25 N. Mex. 219, 180 Pac. 284 (1919).
17 202 Ill. App. 43 (lst Dist. 1916).
12
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of which defendant was ignorant, and that defendant, on due
inquiry, was led to believe that he was dealing with an entirely new
party and was not to pay commissions and was thereby induced to
sell at such lower price, we think the element of good faith is
material. It would . . seem unjust if he acted in good faith in the
transaction that he should be mulcted for damages in the form
of commissions because of bad faith and deceit practiced upon
him by plaintiffs' customer . . ..
In addition to the above exceptions, if the broker's authority
expires, or is terminated in good faith, or if the broker abandons
his efforts to sell, the broker is not entitled to a commission even
if the owner later sells to a buyer originally found by the broker.
These matters are discussed in detail in section II(d) of this
symposium.
If none of the above exceptions apply, the broker is entitled
to recover a commission. It is generally held that when a sale is
made by the owner at a lower price than the agent is authorized
to offer, the commission allowed is the contract rate on the actual
sale price.' 9 Thus, in McConaughy v. Mahannah, 20 the broker
was to receive a 2% commission if he sold at $35 per acre; the
defendant sold the property to the broker's prospect at $32 per
acre. The court held that the broker was entitled to a 2% commission on the actual selling price.
B. STRATTON
18 202 Ill. App. at 47. See also, Mears v. Stone, 44 Ill. App. 444 (1st Dist. 1892).
19 Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 848, 885 (1956); Annot., 43 A.L.R. 1103, 1122 (1926).
20 28 Ill. App. 169 (2d Dist. 1888).

